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Abstract 
 
This paper has three main objectives, namely to (a) propose a new framework that can support 
placing countries along a core-periphery continuum (beyond the more common binary 
treatment as either core or periphery), (b) to construct a continuous dynamic theory-based 
measure (the first, to the best of our knowledge) illustrating the use of this framework for a set 
of European countries using yearly data from 1960 to 2015, and (c) provide a first preliminary 
assessment, based on endogenous Optimal Currency Area (OCA) theory, of the main potential 
explanatory factors of the dynamics of this measure over time and across countries. Our main 
finding is that this new measure allows us to identify sets of countries on the basis of not only 
its level but also in terms of its dynamic behaviour. Using the Phillips-Sul procedure, we show 
the emergence a newer set of core countries (composed by Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, 
Italy and Netherlands), a mixed set of countries (namely Denmark, Sweden, Greece, Spain and 
the UK), and a set of deep-rooted periphery countries (Finland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, and 
Switzerland). There are valuable lessons from the dynamics of this measure. It increases for 
core countries (which confirms endogenous OCA predictions), remains worrisomely constant 
for a periphery, and varies substantially for the intermediate set of countries. Spain (Sweden 
and Greece) becomes consistently more (less) core over time, Denmark’s remains constant and 
the UK moves in and out of the core over time. Our panel estimates on a specification suggested 
by endogenous OCA theory imply that euro membership and more flexible product market 
regulations (or trade openness) make countries more likely to be in the core. 
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Symmetry and Convergence in Monetary 
Unions 
 
1. Introduction 
The protracted economic crisis in the Eurozone has fuelled demands for a 
deeper understanding of the dynamics of core and periphery groups of 
countries in the European Union, in general, and in its Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), in particular. There is now widespread consensus on the 
shortcomings of the EMU with even the European Commission openly 
recognising them and proposing as solution the building up of a Genuine EMU 
(Begg 2015). Such extensive agreement on the need for solutions co-exists with 
deep disagreement on causes. One view is that design flaws deepened 
imbalances (De Grauwe 2016) while another is that policy mistakes hindered 
convergence (Sandbu 2015). One solution that has been proposed is a flexible 
euro (Stiglitz 2016): a two-tier model of a Northern and a Southern Euro where 
the latter is softer. One tautological way to explain this is that the Southern euro 
countries would not be part of the core.   
This paper has three main objectives, namely to (a) propose a new framework 
that can support placing countries along a core-periphery continuum (beyond 
the much more common binary treatment as either core or periphery), (b) to 
construct a continuous dynamic theory-based measure (the first, to the best of 
our knowledge) illustrating the use of this framework for a set of European 
countries using yearly data from 1960 to 2015, and (c) provide a first 
preliminary assessment, based on endogenous Optimal Currency Area 
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(hereafter OCA) theory, of the main potential explanatory factors of the 
dynamics of this measure over time and across countries.  
The natural point of departure is the seminal paper by Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993). This is one of the first papers to identify a core-periphery 
pattern in the run-up to the European Monetary Union (EMU). Motivated by 
OCA theory and using a modified Blanchard-Quah decomposition within the 
Aggregate Supply-Aggregate Demand (AS-AD) framework, they estimate the 
degree of demand and supply shocks synchronization for 1963-1989 data. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen show that there is a core where shocks are highly 
correlated (Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Denmark) and a 
periphery where this correlation is significantly lower (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and UK). They forewarn that if persistent, this core-periphery 
pattern would be detrimental to the EMU project.   
We follow the large literature started by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) in 
that our exercise is also couched in the canonical AS-AD model. The model 
implies that positive demand shocks raise prices in both the short- and long-
run with no output effects in the long-run, while positive supply shocks lower 
prices and increase output permanently. De Haan et al. (2008) and Santos and 
Tenreyro (2010) review this vast literature: It tends not to impose output related 
restrictions for tractability reasons as this choice leaves their models exactly 
identified. The novelty of our approach is to explicitly model these output 
considerations as over-identifying restrictions. We impose this over-
identifying restriction in a structural VAR framework so that the predicted 
effects of supply shocks on output are accounted for.  
There are three main findings regarding symmetry, convergence and correlates 
of symmetry. Firstly, modelling supply considerations as over-identifying 
restrictions produces a new theory-based continuous measure. Our measure is 
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the percentage of times this fuller, or more structural, AS-AD model is rejected. 
The more frequently this full set of restrictions is rejected, the more peripheral 
a country is said to be. The lower this frequency is, that is, the less often the full 
AS-AD model is rejected for a given country in a given year, the higher is the 
probability of a country being classified as core. This is implemented by 
bootstrapping the original VAR residuals and counting the number of 
rejections at each bootstrap replication: country-years for which the AS-AD 
model is rejected more (less) than half of the time are classified as periphery 
(core). For convenience, we call our index NORD (as it reflects the “number of 
rejections dynamics.”) 
Secondly, we study convergence using the Phillips and Sul (2007) framework. 
Here, we are able to identify a new set of core countries (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy and Netherlands), an intermediary set (Denmark, 
Greece, Spain, Sweden and the UK), and a periphery (Finland, Ireland, 
Norway, Portugal and Switzerland). Notice that NORD decreases for the core 
countries (broadly confirming the endogenous OCA predictions), remains high 
and constant for a deep-rooted periphery (worrisomely corroborating Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen’s early warnings), and varies substantially for a mixed set of 
countries. As for the latter, Spain moves towards the core over time. Greece 
and, somewhat surprisingly, Sweden become “more peripheral” over time. 
Denmark is practically static while the UK seems to charge in and out of the 
core.  
The third main finding refers to our attempt to uncover factors that can help 
explain the variation of this new measure across countries and over time. We 
believe these correlates indicate whether or not our measure is doing a good 
job at capturing core, periphery, and their dynamics; the latter being an issue 
that has received scant attention in previous research. Using a specification 
based on endogenous OCA theory, panel estimates suggest that euro 
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membership and stricter product market regulations make countries more or 
less core, respectively. Further, we find that trade openness and, to a lesser 
extent, foreign direct investment, help to “import competition” and in so doing 
substitute for regulations: imports (but not so much exports) increase the 
probability of a country being classified as core. The findings are robust to 
numerous changes in specification, measurement, estimators (e.g., OLS or 
probit) and split samples (e.g., post-crisis period).    
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up the conceptual framework. 
Section 3 discusses implementation and estimation issues. Section 4 introduces 
our new measure. Section 5 presents econometric results evaluating the 
robustness of this new measure. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Core and Periphery in Optimum Currency Areas 
In this section, we discuss why to understand the importance and urgency of 
core and periphery dynamics in the European Union, in general, and in the 
EMU, in particular, one should go beyond the standard business cycles 
synchronisation framework and towards a more encompassing notion. Based 
on optimal currency area (OCA) theory considerations, we discuss other 
approaches to identify core-periphery sets so as to properly contextualise our 
effort.   
The main research question driving the OCA scholarship regards the costs and 
benefits of sharing a currency (Alesina and Barro 2002). The main cost is the 
loss of monetary policy autonomy. Benefits are mostly in terms of reducing 
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transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty, and of increasing price 
transparency, trade and competition.1  
One way of framing the issue of optimum currency areas (OCA) is presented 
by De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005). They study interactions between 
symmetry, flexibility and openness. Particularly, they show that there exists a 
minimum combination of these that countries must reach for a monetary union 
to generate positive net benefits (see also Farhi and Werning 2015). De Grauwe 
and Mongelli (2005) place the Eurozone (EU) within (outside) of the OCA-line 
suggesting that those countries are (not yet) sufficiently integrated to generate 
efficiency gains that can compensate for the macroeconomic costs of the union. 
They also note the degree of openness and symmetry may change over time. 
Before the EMU, there was an intense debate about the extent to which a 
monetary union affects symmetry (Krugman 1993). De Grauwe and Mongelli’s 
(2005) view is that in the EU specialisation will bring about less symmetry and 
thus countries move downwards along the OCA plane. 
There are at least two noteworthy recent developments in OCA theory. The 
original OCA formulation stressed labour mobility, product diversification and 
trade openness as key criteria and explored the possible endogeneity of 
currency unions (Frankel and Rose 1998). Recent work called attention to the 
additional role of credibility shocks. If there are varying degrees of policy 
commitment (furthering time inconsistency problems), countries with 
dissimilar credibility shocks should find it convenient to join a currency union 
(Chari et al. 2015). 
                                                 
 1 The literature is surveyed in De Haan et al. (2008), Silva and Tenreyro (2010) and Glick and Rose (2016).   
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 A second recent and important strand highlights that, although OCA criteria 
are often thought of as independent, they should instead be considered jointly, 
e.g., by focusing on the interactions between openness and mobility (Farhi and 
Werning 2015).   
The optimality of a currency area is a function of the relative power (and of the 
relative “distance”) between its members. If these differentials are large, it is 
common to speak of a core and a periphery. It is expected that core countries 
would be those more closely meeting the OCA criteria. Given its importance 
for OCA, it is not surprising there have been various attempts to classify 
countries into core and periphery sets. A basic way of distinguishing these 
methods is whether or not core-periphery status is imposed a priori.   
A statistical technique often used here is cluster analysis. This method helps to 
determine the overall number and the composition of different groupings (or 
clusters) given that the elements (countries or regions) which are assigned to a 
given cluster are more similar to each other than to those in other clusters 
according to pre-defined criteria. Cluster analysis is a broad statistical 
methodology that involves various ways of estimating these groups and the 
distance among them. These can be thought of as different algorithms differing 
in their criteria and efficiency in determining the composition of each cluster.  
Artis and Zhang (2001) investigate actual and prospective membership of the 
EMU by applying clustering techniques to a set of variables suggested by the 
theory of Optimal Currency Areas. The OCA criteria they employ are the extent 
of synchronisation in business cycles (symmetry in output shocks), volatility in 
the real exchange rate, synchronisation in the real interest rate cycle, openness 
to trade, inflation convergence, and labour market flexibility. Their analysis 
reveals that the member countries may be divided into three groups: those 
belonging to the core (Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and the 
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Netherlands), those part of a Northern periphery (Denmark, Ireland, the UK, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and Finland) and those belonging to a Southern 
periphery (Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece). Their method delivers a rather 
intuitive classification of countries and, more usefully, allows researchers to see 
how these classifications change for each of the OCA criteria and multiple 
combinations of them. 
There are other, more theory-based, approaches. Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1993) is a seminal piece in this regard. They put forward an approach stressing 
business cycle synchronisation embedded in a standard Aggregate Demand 
and Aggregate Supply framework. Using 1960 to 1989 data, they classify 
countries into core and periphery groups and famously warn that the gap 
between these groups puts in risk the very planning of the Single Currency. We 
discuss these results below in greater detail, but it is important to bring to the 
fore a related paper by these authors that produces an objective index to classify 
countries into core and non-core.  
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) construct an “optimum-currency-area index 
for European countries.” The crucial element of their approach is to identify the 
determinants of nominal exchange rate variability which they argue reflect 
OCA characteristics and support predictions of which countries pertain to each 
set. This is justified conceptually and empirically. Conceptually, they argue 
that OCA focuses on criteria that ultimately make exchange rates more stable 
and monetary unification less costly. In their model, bilateral exchange rate 
variability is a function of GDP, trade, economic structure dissimilarity, and a 
measure of output synchronisation. Using 1973 to 1992 data, they find these to 
carry the expected signs and that they are statistically significant, so they use 
them to forecast variability in 1987, 1991 and 1995.  
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Their econometric analysis allows them to identify three groups: in the first 
“rapidly converging” group are Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Ireland and Switzerland. The second group is one that has experienced little 
convergence and contains United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
France. The third group is a set of countries that are “gradually converging” to 
the EMU and includes Sweden, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain. The two most 
consequential results from this analysis, with the benefit of hindsight, are that 
(1) France is positioned in the set that diverges from the Maastricht criteria but 
(2) that overall “economic integration has thus increased countries’ readiness 
for monetary integration” (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1997, p 769).  
A different estimation framework to analyse the issue of asymmetries in the 
EMU is Basse (2014) which uses cointegration and structural breaks to try to 
identify EMU core member countries. The OCA dimension he is most 
interested in is changes in sovereign credit risk (bond markets) and the sample 
includes only selected EMU members (Germany, France, Belgium, Austria, 
Finland, and the Netherlands.) The main finding raises questions about the 
suitability of France as a core country. 
One final noteworthy approach in terms of providing useful insights to 
understanding core and periphery in the EMU involves studies in which 
membership is assigned in advance, a priori. Arestis and Phelps (2016) perform 
an “endogeneity analysis” of output synchronization (differentiating output 
amplitude from concordance) using panel data (covering 1994 to 2013), for all 
members as well as for different country groups, including core, periphery, 
central and eastern European countries, northern European countries and the 
euro-candidate countries. The quantification of trade-related and direct 
spillover channels associated with monetary integration gives insights into the 
relative importance of direct and indirect (through trade) synchronisation 
gains arising from EMU membership. For all members, membership and trade 
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appear to increase both amplitude and coincidence of their business cycles. The 
individual group analysis shows that core and northern countries have 
experienced much larger trade spillovers in terms of synchronisation than 
peripheral and Central and Eastern European countries. They suggest future 
research on the direct euro membership effects by trying to unpack the role of 
institutions and changes in the transmission mechanism since the introduction 
of the single currency. 
 
3. Implementation 
The methodology introduced by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) is an 
extension of the Blanchard and Quah (1989) procedure for decomposing 
permanent (supply) and temporary (demand) shocks. Consider a system 
where the true model is represented by an infinite moving average of a (vector) 
of variables, 𝑋𝑡 , and shocks, 𝜖𝑡 . Using the lag operator L, a bi-variate VAR 
featuring real GDP and its deflator can be written as an infinite moving average 
representation of demand and supply disturbances: 
𝑋𝑡 =  𝐴0𝜖𝑡 + 𝐴1𝜖𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝜖𝑡−2 + 𝐴3𝜖𝑡−3 + ⋯ =  ∑ 𝐿𝑖𝐴𝑖𝜖𝑡∞𝑖=0  (1) 
where 𝑋𝑡 = [Δ𝑦𝑡, Δ𝑝𝑡]  and the matrices 𝐴  represent the impulse response 
functions of the shocks to the elements of 𝑋.  It follows that 
[
Δ𝑦𝑡
Δ𝑝𝑡
] = ∑ 𝐿𝑖 [
𝑎11𝑖 𝑎12𝑖
𝑎21𝑖 𝑎22𝑖
]∞𝑖=0 [
𝜖𝑑𝑡
𝜖𝑠𝑡
]     (2) 
where 𝑦𝑡and 𝑝𝑡 represent the logarithm of the adjusted output and prices and 
𝜖𝑡 are 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. disturbances, which identify supply and demand shocks (Ramey 
2016). For the i-th country, 𝑎11𝑖 represents element 𝑎11, in matrix 𝐴𝑖 and so on. 
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This framework implies that supply shocks have permanent effects on output, 
while demand shocks have temporary effects. Both have permanent (opposite) 
effects on prices. The cumulative effect of demand shocks on the change in 
output must be zero: 
∑ 𝑎11𝑖 = 0∞𝑖=0         (3) 
so it can be estimated using a VAR. Each element can be regressed on lagged 
values of all the elements of 𝑋. Using B to represent these estimated coefficients: 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝐵1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝑋𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝐵𝑛𝑋𝑡−𝑛 + 𝑒𝑡        
= (𝐼 − 𝐵(𝐿))
−1
𝑒𝑡       (4) 
= (𝐼 + 𝐵(𝐿) + 𝐵(𝐿)2 + ⋯ )𝑒𝑡 
= 𝑒𝑡 + 𝐷1𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝐷2𝑒𝑡−2 + 𝐷3𝑒𝑡−3 
where 𝑒𝑡 represents the residuals from the VAR equations. In order to convert 
(4) into the model in (2) under (3), the residuals from the VAR, 𝑒𝑡 , are 
transformed into demand and supply shocks using the standard relation 
between the VAR’s residuals (𝑒𝑡) and demand and supply shocks, i.e. 𝑒𝑡  =  𝐶𝜖𝑡. 
For each country, exact identification of the C matrix requires four restrictions. 
Two are normalizations, which define the variance of the shocks 𝜖𝑑𝑡 and 𝜖𝑠𝑡 . 
The third restriction is from assuming that demand and supply shocks are 
orthogonal to each other. The fourth that demand shocks have only temporary 
effects on output (equation 3).  
Figure 1 reproduces the seminal results from Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993.) 
Using pre-EMU data to estimate the degree of business cycles synchronization, 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen convincingly argue that there is a core (Germany, 
France, Belgium, Netherlands and Denmark) where supply shocks are highly 
correlated and a periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK) 
Nauro F. Campos and Corrado Macchiarelli 
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where synchronisation is lower. Importantly, these two groups are clearly 
visible “to the naked eye,” especially from the point of view of supply shocks. 
Figure 1. Pre-EMU core-periphery pattern (1960-1987) 
 
The standard AD-AS model implies that demand shocks raise prices in both 
the short and long run, while supply shocks lower prices and increase demand 
permanently. In order to fully reflect the structure of the underlying theoretical 
model, we impose an additional over-identifying restriction in the VAR that 
supply shocks have permanent effects on output.2 
                                                 
 2 In addition to trying to implement the AS-AD model more fully, another important reason we adopt the proposed over-identifying restriction is that inflation differentials are often considered 
a ‘normal feature of currency unions’ (see e.g., ECB 2017), hence we impose no restrictions on the reaction of inflation to demand and supply shocks, respectively. 
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We pay particular attention to modelling the effect of permanent (supply) 
shocks on output, on top of the usual demand-side one. Since the proposed 
over-identifying restriction is sufficient to generate structural disturbances in 
line with AD-AS dynamics, any additional long-run restriction may be 
redundant in this setting. 
Theoretically, testing for the “symmetry” of shocks also reflects the idea that 
the distinction between permanent and temporary shocks matters when it 
comes to adjustment within a currency union. According to De Grauwe (2016), 
when shocks are permanent, the slope of the usual existing trade-off between 
flexibility and symmetry is likely to depend on the nature of the shocks. 
Particularly, when permanent shocks dominate this tradeoff is likely to be 
steeper. Conversely, when temporary shocks dominate, the tradeoff will be 
flatter. We extend this idea further and suggest that it is not only the nature of 
the shock that matters but also the direction and extent by which shocks are 
pushing an economy “out of sync.” 
We test for symmetry of permanent shocks in our model by imposing 
∑ 𝑎12𝑖 = 𝛾∞𝑖=0 , where 𝛾 > 0. This assumption implies that demand across each 
country respond qualitatively (sign) and quantitatively (size) in the same way 
to supply shocks. In terms of the structural VAR: 
∑ [
𝑑11𝑖 𝑑12𝑖
𝑑21𝑖 𝑑22𝑖
]∞𝑖=1 [
𝑐11 𝑐12
𝑐21 𝑐22
] = [0 𝛾
. .
]    (5) 
In order to construct a test for the over-identifying restriction described above, 
we estimate a SVAR model that is fully consistent with Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993). Differently from the literature that follows Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen, we bootstrap the original VAR residuals in a i.i.d. fashion and 
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generate K = 10.000 data sets.3 For each of the k-th samples, we proceed with a 
structural analysis and test for the over-identifying restriction based on a LR-
test. We record the number of rejections of the over-identifying restriction test 
at each bootstrap replication and calculate the number of rejections (NORD): 
𝑁𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖 =  100 ×
∑ {𝑁𝑂𝑅𝐷 = 1|−2(𝐿𝑟 − 𝐿𝑢) > χ
𝑞−(𝑛
2−𝑛
2 )
2 }
𝑖,𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝐾
 (6) 
where 𝐿𝑢 and 𝐿𝑟   are the maximized values of the (Gaussian) log likelihood 
function of the unrestricted and restricted regressions, respectively. Under 𝐻0, 
the LR statistic has an asymptotic distribution with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of long-run restrictions (𝑞) minus (𝑛2 − 𝑛)/2, where 𝑛 is the 
VAR-dimension (in this case 𝑛 = 2). We calculate 𝑁𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖  for different values of 
𝛾. Notice that we do not restrict 𝛾 to a fixed value a priori. Instead, we vary 𝛾 in 
the interval [0.1, 2] We then chose the value of 𝛾 which minimizes the total 
number of rejections in the sample (Table 1A.) Demand and supply shocks are 
then retrieved by bootstrap, in particular recalculating the VAR parameters (K 
= 10.000), identifying the SVAR and considering median values of structural 
disturbances under 𝛾 = 1. 
As noted above, the seminal Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) paper uses data 
from 1960 to 1988, that is, prior to the EMU and the euro. In order to assess the 
effect of the EMU, Campos and Macchiarelli (2016) use the same estimation 
methodology (SVAR with two lags for all countries, no constant, and yearly 
data with respect to Germany), sample of 12 countries, and time window (25 
                                                 
 3 One concern is the possible effects from any regime changes between 1960 and 2015. Using a dummy saturation approach, first proposed by Hendry et al. (2008), we attempt to detect model selection problems and correct the original series for possible regime changes.  In the light of the above, we identify three regimes for both GDP and inflation, broadly consistent across countries: 1960:I-1969:I; 1984:I-1992:I; and 2008:I-2015:I. 
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years), but with the (median bootstrapped) residuals and over-identifying 
restriction imposed for the sample 1989–2015. Figure 2 shows their results. 
Figure 2. Post-EMU core-periphery pattern (1990-2015) Correlation of supply and demand disturbances (Bootstrapped residuals – median values) 
 Note: This figure reports median bootstrapped residuals based on 10.000 VAR replications. Structural residuals are retrieved from a SVAR where the over-identifying restriction above is imposed for all countries, with the exception of Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal. The sample for this SVAR is 1989–2015, with two lags for all countries and no constant as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). The demand and supply disturbances correlation coefficients   are reported in Appendix Table 4A.  Source: Campos and Macchiarelli (2016)  
A comparison of the results in Figure 1 with those in Figure 2 help shed light 
on whether the EMU strengthened or weakened the core-periphery pattern. 
This comparison suggests that the introduction of the euro weakened or 
loosened the original divide. It is also clear, however, that this now cannot be 
grasped simply through visual inspection. In other words, the identification of 
core and periphery groups can not anymore be carried out by “the naked eye.” 
Nauro F. Campos and Corrado Macchiarelli 
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A quantitative measure appears to have become necessary. Using NORD, there 
is now a larger number of countries in the core, a smaller number in the 
periphery, and the distance between the two groups is shorter. The new smaller 
periphery is comprised solely of Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece, with the 
UK and Italy having joined the core since the late 1980s. 
 
4. The Dynamics of Core and Periphery  
Three major drawbacks from the existing empirical measures of symmetry in 
currency unions are that (a) they tend not to be continuous (a country is 
classified either as core or as periphery), (b) they are often imposed a priori and 
(c) they tend to be time-invariant. One may add that most of these measures 
are not theory-based. The approach we develop above generates a new type of 
measure that relaxes these main constraints.  
One way of thinking about it is in terms of assessing parameter constancy. Let 
T be larger than before (55 years, i.e. 1960-2015) and 𝜏 denote the width of a 
sub-sample (25 years) or window and define the rolling sample metrics: 
𝑁𝑂𝑅𝐷ti(𝜏) =
1
𝜏−1
∑ 𝑁𝑂𝑅𝐷(𝑡−𝑗)𝑖(𝜏)
𝜏−1
𝑗=0     (7) 
The windows are rolled through the sample one observation at a time, so that 
the procedure returns 𝑇 − 𝜏 +  1 rolling estimates of each parameter. Using a 
fixed 25-year window, we obtain a value representing the end-of-period 
number of rejections for each year, out of the number of the bootstrap 
replications. This number thus represents the count of the number of times the 
over-identifying restriction in the AS-AD framework is rejected for each 
country for the selected time period. The window is then rolled one observation 
at a time and new estimates are obtained for the whole time-series.   
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These results are presented in Figures 3 to 7 which show 𝑁𝑂𝑅𝐷ti for various 
groups of countries, yearly from 1987 to 2015. Figure 3 shows all 16 countries 
in our sample. We generate our measure for all European countries for which 
the required data series are available between 1960 and 2015. Figure 3 is shown 
simply to illustrate as clearly as possible that in our case it is practically 
impossible to differentiate groups of countries “at the naked eye.” Therefore, a 
more systematic and transparent procedure is needed. 
Figure 3. 
NORD for 16 countries, 1990-2015 (Core-periphery dynamics) 
  
Another criticism to the approach we propose above, particularly in deriving 
our indicator from bivariate VARs that take into consideration GDP and its 
deflator only, is that the number of rejections may be capturing common (or, in 
this case, euro) area factors. In other words, the number of rejections of the 
symmetry hypothesis may be lower in those countries where common factors 
are stronger. To try to address this concern in full, we use the panel data model 
first proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007). For each time-series of our indicator, 
Nauro F. Campos and Corrado Macchiarelli 
 17 
the model assumes both common and individual specific components and is 
formulated as a nonlinear time-varying factor model, allowing for a wide range 
of possible time paths and individual heterogeneity. This decomposition 
provides flexibility in idiosyncratic behaviour over time and across cross-
sections while retaining some commonality across the panel by means of an 
unknown common component which we identify as a latent ‘euro area factor’. 
In this case, commonality means that when the heterogeneous time-varying 
idiosyncratic components converge over time to a constant, a form of panel 
convergence holds, which is analogous to the concept of conditional sigma 
convergence. The procedure not only does not impose any particular 
assumption concerning trend stationarity, thereby being robust to the 
stationarity property of the time series process, but also has the advantage of 
singling out a common factor, isolating it from idiosyncratic factors. 
 The measure we derived above, NORD, is a bounded variable [0,100] and 
cannot be described by a random walk. However, both from an empirical and 
theoretical point of view, if its adjustment is slow, NORD may behave 
approximately as a random walk over the sample period. That is, within the 
chosen sample, the process does not show any tendency to be mean-reverting. 
This is evident by looking at the pattern of the dynamics of our indicator 
(particularly for what we have identified as peripheral countries.) When a 
process is close to having a unit root, the misspecified model introduced by 
assuming a unit root can be a good approximation to the true data-generating 
process. In fact, the misspecification introduced by assuming stationarity when 
in reality there is a unit root leads to more serious errors of inference. The issue 
may be important in our case if one assumes that structural euro area factors 
are increasing or reducing the degree of symmetry amongst countries, such 
that a path dependency of symmetry exists. 
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Formally, the approach Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) propose allows to isolate 
a common factor from the estimated dynamic NOR (NORD), distinguishing it 
from country-specific factors. The common factor may represent the 
aggregated common behaviour, but it could also be any common variable of 
influence on individual behaviour.   
The starting point of the model is decomposing the panel data of our variable 
of interest, 𝑁𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 , as: 
𝑁𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  𝑔𝑖𝑡  +  𝑎𝑖𝑡       (8) 
where 𝑔𝑖𝑡  represents systematic components (such as permanent common 
component), and 𝑎𝑖𝑡 reflects country-specific transitory components. In order 
to separate common from idiosyncratic components, Eq. (1.8) is further 
transformed as: 
𝑁𝑂𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  (
𝑔𝑖𝑡  + 𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑎𝑡
) 𝑒𝑎𝑡  =  𝛿𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡     (9) 
where 𝛿𝑖𝑡 is a time varying idiosyncratic element and 𝑒𝑎𝑡 is a single common 
(‘euro area’) component. Equation 9 is a dynamic factor model where ut 
captures some deterministic or stochastically trending behaviour and δit is the 
time varying factor-loading.   
In the general case, it is impossible to estimate the model directly without 
imposing some structure on 𝛿𝑖𝑡   and 𝑎𝑡 . Phillips and Sul (2007) propose 
removing the common factor by scaling so as to obtain the relative loading 
coefficient: 
ℎ𝑖𝑡  =  
𝑋𝑖𝑡
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑖=1
= 𝛿𝑖𝑡1
𝑁
∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑖=1
      (10) 
which they called the “relative transition parameter,” measuring the loading 
coefficient relative to the panel average at time 𝑡. By definition, ℎ𝑖𝑡 traces out a 
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transition path of individual 𝑖 in relation to the panel average (Phillips and Sul 
2007). 
We use the Philipps and Sul econometric toolbox to evaluate the convergence 
properties of the estimated time-varying idiosyncratic components. Their 
suggested procedure for clustering panel data into clubs with similar 
convergence characteristics is as follows: 
𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑡→∞
𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑋𝑗𝑡
= 1  𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗      (11) 
Phillips and Sul (2007) define this condition as “relative convergence.” This 
condition is equivalent to convergence of the time varying factor-loading 
coefficient: 
𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑡→∞𝛿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∀ 𝑖       (12) 
Showing that the cross sectional mean of ℎ𝑖𝑡 is unity and the cross sectional 
variance of ℎ𝑖𝑡  satisfies the condition 𝐻𝑖𝑡 =  
1
𝑁
∑ (ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 1)2 →𝑁𝑖=1
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑡→∞𝛿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿  𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∀ 𝑖 , Phillips and Sul (2007) develop a regression test of 
the null hypothesis of convergence. Specifically, the hypothesis is implemented 
by means of the following ‘log t’ regression model: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝐻1
𝐻𝑡
) − 2 log(log(𝑡)) = 𝑎 + 𝑏 log(𝑡) + 𝜖𝑡   (13) 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 =  [𝑟𝑇], [𝑟𝑇]  +  1, . . . , 𝑇 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑟 >  0 
where 𝑟 is a selection of the initial sample fraction. Phillips and Sul’s Monte 
Carlo simulations indicate that 𝑟  ∈ [0.2, 0.3] achieves a satisfactory 
performance. In line with their results, we set 𝑟 =  0.3 because of the short time 
series in our panel (𝑇 = 29).  
When we run the log t regression for the convergence test under the null 
hypothesis of convergence for the whole panel, the value of the t statistic is -
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5.5874 which is less than -1.65, hence the null hypothesis of overall convergence 
is rejected at the 5% level. However, the rejection of the hypothesis does not 
exclude the possibility of the existence of convergence clubs. When testing for 
convergence among sub-groups, the clustering of convergence sub-groups 
suggests the following partition: 
Club 1: Ireland, Norway, Switzerland  
Club 2: Finland, Greece, Portugal, Sweden 
Club 3: Denmark, Spain, UK 
Club 4: France, Italy 
Club 5: Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands 
The results suggest all the clubs fulfil the convergence hypothesis jointly 
(Appendix 9). However, the interpretation of the t-statistics requires care: while 
the Phillips and Sul’s routine may have a natural interpretation for the extent 
of incremental economic growth and convergence across countries, the 
intuition regarding the convergence pattern in the degree of symmetry 
reflected by NORD may be less straightforward. In fact, in our setting countries 
showing the strongest degree of divergence from the core are often the ones for 
which the NORD has the strongest root.  
To further investigate this issue, we perform the tests for possible club mergers 
Phillips and Sul (2007) suggest. These show statistical support to the possibility 
that the original Clubs 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 can be merged to form larger 
convergence clubs.  This implies that three main clubs of countries may have 
emerged since the euro introduction, namely an extended periphery composed 
by Finland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, Greece, an 
intermediate group formed by Denmark, Spain, UK, France, and Italy, and a 
harder core where one would find Austria, Belgium, Germany, the 
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Netherlands. It is noteworthy that these results are consistent with previous 
analyses (e.g., Campos and Macchiarelli 2016). 
Figure 4 shows a first group that have in common a sustained decline in the 
probability of being classified as periphery (i.e., NORD). We call it the core 
group. Using the convenient 50% mark for these classification purposes, one 
can see that the three first countries to enter the core are Germany, France and 
Austria, all by 1999. This is of course the year in which the euro was introduced. 
Belgium joins the core in 2000, while Italy and the Netherlands join before 2007. 
If one equates core membership with a strong indication of being part of an 
optimum currency area (OCA), these results are unique in that they show a 
somewhat gradual formation over time of an OCA. Moreover, if one accepts 
this interpretation, the results in Figure 3 provide evidence in favour of 
endogenous OCA theory (Frankel and Rose 1998) as countries only enter or join 
the core after the currency union is in place. 
Figure 4. 
NORD for core countries, 1990-2015 (Core-periphery dynamics) 
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The group of countries we call periphery is shown in Figure 5. Not only these 
five countries all have very high levels of NORD, they do so throughout. In 
other words, their scores are consistently above the 50% mark and these scores 
are worrisomely trendless. They provide strong, albeit somewhat qualified, 
confirmation of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) famous early warning about 
the EMU, specifically about the possibility of an entrenched core and periphery 
pattern driven by the latter being deep-seated. It is noteworthy that neither 
Norway nor Switzerland are eurozone countries, although Portugal, Finland 
and Ireland are.   
Figure 5. 
NORD for periphery countries, 1990-2015 (Core-periphery dynamics) 
 
The Philips-Sul procedure also identifies an intermediary or mixed set of 
countries. Within this group, one distinguishes between two main sub-sets: one 
for which NORD does not seem to show any clear trends between 1987 and 
2015, and another one for which it does. Figure 6 shows that the UK and 
Denmark are good candidates for the intermediate set. Yet, while Denmark’s 
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NORD barely moves over time, the opposite can be observed for the UK, 
displaying high volatility in and out of the core.   
Figure 6. 
NORD for intermediary countries, 1990-2015 (Core-periphery dynamics) 
 
Figure 7 shows the remaining three countries, those at intermediate levels of 
NORD but with clearly distinguishable trends instead. Here, Spain’s NORD is 
basically flat until 1999 and starts to decline fast afterwards, clearly moving 
towards the core (linear interpolation suggests it may enter circa 2020.) On the 
other hand, Greece and Sweden distinctively move away from the core. In other 
words, they become more peripheral over time. It is interesting to note, 
however, that between the introduction of the euro in 1999 and the onset of the 
financial crisis in 2007, Greece was instead moving in the “right direction,” that 
is, towards the core.  
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Figure 7. 
NORD for intermediary countries, 1990-2015 (Core-periphery dynamics) 
 
In summary, the results above reveal that the core and periphery pattern has 
changed considerably since the late 1980s, both in terms of relative strengths 
and distances between main groups of countries but also in terms of the 
trajectories of individual countries (for instance, it is interesting to see how 
different countries join the core at different points in time.) Overall, our new 
theory-based index, NORD, can be seen to decreases over time for the set of 
countries that the Philips and Sul (2007) procedure single out and that we call 
“core” (a result which broadly confirms endogenous OCA predictions), it 
remains high and basically constant for a more peripheral group (worrisomely 
confirming Bayoumi and Eichengreen’s warning about a deep-seated 
periphery), and it varies substantially for a mixed set of countries between 1987 
and 2015. Denmark’s NORD remains constant around the 50% mark while the 
UK’s score over time makes it move in and out of the core. The results for Spain 
are quite optimistic as they show that although the country should still be 
classified as periphery, it is moving towards the core. This is in contrast to two 
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much more worrisome trends: according to their NORD scores, Greece and 
Sweden are slowly moving away from the core group of countries, or in other 
words, gradually becoming more and more peripheral in the EMU. 
 
5. Evaluating NORD (“Number of rejections dynamics”) 
The objective of this section is to assess our new theory-based continuous 
measure of the probability of a country being classified as periphery (NORD 
above 50%). Given data availability, we produced this index for 16 European 
countries on a yearly basis between 1987 and 2015.   
In order to shed light on the behaviour of NORD across countries and over 
time, we draw from OCA theory (De Grauwe 2016) and enlist a standard set of 
candidate explanatory variables. One first group refers to explanatory variables 
on the fiscal side (Martin and Philippon 2017). The expectation, in this case, is 
that countries for which debt to GDP ratios and cyclically adjusted budget 
balances are larger, should be more likely to be classified as periphery. 
A second group of explanatory variables focuses on financial links, more 
specifically we use corporate bond spreads, 10-year government bond spreads, 
3-month interbank interest rate spreads, average consumer loan interest rate 
spreads, and returns on equity differential. All spreads are computed vis-à-vis 
Germany. This set of financial variables is consistent with the European Central 
Bank’s definitions of financial integration (ECB 2017, Spiegel 2009). Our prior 
in this case is that the more financially integrated an individual country is with 
the rest of the EU in a given year, the more likely it will not be classified as 
pertaining to the periphery.   
A third group of variables we use to assess the validity of our index covers 
external links, in particular, the roles of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, 
Symmetry and Convergence in Monetary Unions 
 
  26 
the real effective exchange rate, and trade openness (Rose 2000, Brouwer et al. 
2008). Note that, in this latter case, we examine the potentially different roles of 
the shares of exports and imports over GDP. Our expectation here is that larger 
the inflows of FDI, increases in the real exchange rate or in the share of imports 
plus exports in GDP will, all else equal, make a country less likely to be 
classified as periphery. 
The fourth and last main group of explanatory variables we draw upon in order 
to try to evaluate NORD regards structural reforms. Here we use OECD data 
on employment protection legislation (EPL), covering both permanent and 
temporary contracts (Boeri and Garibaldi 2006), and on product markets 
regulation (PMR-overall economy). Our expectation is that the more extensive 
reforms different countries have implemented, the more likely is that they will 
not be classified as periphery. In other words, the more protective is 
employment legislation and the more extensive are product regulations, the 
more likely the country can be classified as peripheral.  
We include a dummy variable for euro area membership in all specifications as 
suggested by the results from the Philips-Sul procedure presented in the 
previous section. Eurozone membership takes the values of one for countries 
joining the EMU starting from accession year.   
The estimation sample includes Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherland, Portugal, plus three EU non-euro 
area countries (Denmark, Sweden and UK) and two countries that are not EU 
members (Switzerland and Norway). We present the results for the period 
1990-2015.  
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In order to address possible endogeneity and omitted variables problems, we 
employ a GMM approach where the weighting matrix is set to equal the 2SLS.4 
In the estimation, the number of endogenous variables equals the number of 
instruments, where we select the instruments to be the lagged dependent 
variables, the constant and the Eurozone (EZ) membership dummy. This choice 
also addresses concerns about the instrument proliferation issue in GMM 
(Roodman, 2009).    
Table 1 shows our baseline results. We include a dummy variable capturing 
membership in the Eurozone throughout and its coefficient is always 
statistically significant and carrying the expected negative sign. It suggests EZ 
membership is associated with a smaller probability of being classified as 
periphery. The first column also shows two important fiscal variables: 
countries with higher debt to GDP ratios and cyclically adjusted budget 
balances are more likely to be classified as periphery (as these are positively 
associated with NORD). Regarding financial integration, notice that only one 
of the four aspects we account for turns out to be statistically significant, 
namely inter-bank spreads. Regarding external linkages, the coefficients on 
both foreign direct investment inflows and the real exchange rate carry the 
expected negative signs and are statistically significant (we confirm below that 
the FDI result is comparatively more robust.) Everything else the same, lower 
values of NORD are associated with countries receiving higher inflows of 
foreign investment. The results in column (4) for trade openness show that the 
larger the share of the sum of exports and imports over GDP, the less likely the 
country is to be classified as periphery. Globalisation, in this sense, helps 
countries to avoid being at the margins. The column (5) has results for two 
                                                 
 4  The results are qualitatively the same if instead we use a Huber/Eicker/White heteroskedasticity-robust variance-covariance matrix (these are available upon request from the authors). 
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structural reforms that have played a big role in the debate so far on Eurozone 
imbalances and they both seem to support NORD as a satisfactory measure. 
They show that the more protective is employment legislation and the more 
regulated are the product markets, the higher is the probability of a country 
being classified as periphery. Overall, these results are strongly supportive of 
NORD as a continuous measure of the probability of a country being classified 
as periphery. There are, simply put, no unexpected or counter-intuitive results. 
The overall results (last column in Table 1) suggest that a strong role is played 
by membership in the Eurozone and by the strictness of product market 
regulation, whereby a high PMR increases the likelihood of being classified as 
periphery. 5  On balance, this set of results strongly support NORD as a 
continuous time-variant measure of the likelihood of a country being in the 
periphery. Membership of the currency union, for the countries in our sample, 
suggests an important role in making countries less “peripheral”, with this 
reduction of likelihood of being classified in the periphery to core being as 
much as 16 percentage points.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 5 This is, in turn, not surprising given that our index is based on supply side dynamics and the extent to which those prompt similar GDP reactions among member states. 6 The results for the EA membership and PMR remain robust when the EA dummy is set to start in 2002, i.e. the year when euro coins were effectively introduced (see Appendix 5).   
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Table 1.  The Determinants of NORD  (16 countries, 1991-2015) 
  (1) Fiscal (2) Financial (3) External (4) Trade (5) Reforms (6) All Debt/GDP 0.118***     0.090   (0.042)     (0.141) Adj. Budget Balance 0.836**     1.629*   (0.336)     (0.965) Corporate bond spread  0.484    0.701    (0.617)    (0.679) 3-month interbank spread  -4.455***    -0.760    (1.435)    (2.742) Avg on consumer loans spread  -0.200    -0.360    (0.479)    (0.866) Return on equity diff.  0.634    -0.623    (0.438)    (0.397) FDI   -0.479***   -0.419**     (0.152)   (0.202) Reer (CPI adj.)   -0.240**   -0.492*     (0.118)   (0.294) Trade openness (%GDP)    -0.135**  -0.457**      (0.065)  (0.191) EPL temporary     5.300*** 4.468       (1.871) (3.856) PMR     6.898* 1.906       (3.537) (6.872) Eurozone membership dummy -19.284*** -28.330*** -12.038*** -11.612*** -8.911*** -15.363** (1999) (2.105) (3.160) (1.935) (2.155) (3.199) (6.243) C 69.516*** 82.239*** 98.345*** 82.566*** 49.242*** 147.812***   (3.135) (2.252) (11.891) (4.693) (7.951) (45.754)                Adj-R2 0.748 0.679  0.710 0.790 0.702 Durbin-Watson 0.577 0.970 0.544 0.465 0.717 1.369 J-Stat (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
 
These overall findings are in line with the idea that one of the main concerns in 
terms of monetary union membership would be again represented by the costs 
of adjustment in order to deal with asymmetries. In the absence of sufficient 
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labor flexibility, and equally of fiscal transfers at the euro-area level, many 
countries suffer from severe adjustment problems. As the crisis made clear, the 
lack of such channels, in the presence of asymmetries, has made the cost of 
adjustment rather high ex post in terms of the preservation of the monetary 
union. 
Table 2 extends our baseline results. Note the coefficient of the dummy variable 
for Eurozone membership as well as that on foreign direct investment remain 
significant throughout. These are robust results. The other key result from 
Table 1 refers to the role of product market regulations (PMR). In Table 2, we 
further investigate this latter result. Specifically, we study whether the greater 
competitive pressures created by decreasing regulations in product markets 
can be somehow captured in different ways. We have in mind the notion that 
these competitive pressures can somehow be “imported” instead. 
The first column of Table 2 suggests that including exports and imports instead 
of trade openness creates a problem of multicollinearity, as not one of the two 
coefficients is statistically significant.7 When each of these variables is introduce 
by itself, their coefficients carry the expected sign and are statistically 
significant. It is also worth noting that the size of the coefficient on imports is 
substantially larger (indeed almost twice as large) as that on exports. More 
importantly for our purposes, note that the coefficient on product market 
regulations is significant only when trade openness, exports or imports are 
excluded from the specification suggesting that these two sets of variables 
(trade and reforms) capture similar mechanisms (competition).   
 
 
                                                 
 
7 This is because of the high pair-wise correlation between these two variables (as shown in 
correlation matrix in the Appendix, multicollinearity is not a problem for any of the variables 
we use, except exports, imports and openness.) 
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Table 2. Importing Competition How Imports/GDP Substitute for PMR regarding NORD (16 countries, 1991-2015) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Debt/GDP 0.057 0.081 0.092 0.090 0.117 0.044   (0.152) (0.143) (0.140) (0.141) (0.148) (0.139) Adj. Budget Balance 1.609 1.654* 1.580* 1.629* 0.978 1.209   (1.029) (0.992) (0.948) (0.965) (0.928) (0.955) Corporate bond spread 0.112 0.464 0.873 0.701 0.166 0.929   (0.928) (0.724) (0.656) (0.679) (0.661) (0.672) Gvt bond spread -1.022 -0.661 -0.340 -0.617 -3.548* -0.581   (1.926) (1.717) (1.649) (1.718) (1.919) (1.704) 3-month interbank spread -0.725 -0.576 -1.053 -0.760 0.717 -2.971   (2.935) (2.802) (2.696) (2.742) (2.504) (2.426) Avg on consumer loans spread -0.478 -0.466 -0.228 -0.360 -0.200 0.439   (0.927) (0.887) (0.850) (0.866) (0.837) (0.754) Return on equity diff. -0.785 -0.689* -0.576 -0.623 -0.557 -0.557   (0.493) (0.411) (0.392) (0.397) (0.378) (0.404) FDI -0.471** -0.434** -0.415** -0.419** -0.425** -0.482**   (0.228) (0.207) (0.200) (0.202) (0.206) (0.211) Reer (CPI adj.) -0.480 -0.503* -0.470 -0.492* -0.525* -0.296   (0.313) (0.303) (0.289) (0.294) (0.291) (0.296) Imports -2.099        (1.547)      Exports 0.863        (1.217)      Imports  -1.105224**        (0.442)     Exports   -0.718**        (0.332)    Trade openness (%GDP)    -0.457** 1.130**       0.191 (0.453)  EPL temporary 5.508975 4.784 4.336 4.468     (4.355) (3.900) (3.852) (3.856)   PMR -0.58216 0.101 3.969 1.906 5.197 13.228**   (7.914) (7.358) (6.523) (6.872) (6.798) (0.017) Openness * EPL temporary     -0.032976        (0.057)  Openness * EPL permanent     -0.765***        (0.195)  Eurozone membership dummy -13.735* -14.850** -15.600** -15.363** -12.405** -14.147** 1999 (6.992) (6.376) (6.192) (6.243) (5.926) (6.365)         
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Finally, we have also investigated whether the effects of PMR would be 
identifiable if we account for possible interactions between trade openness and 
two different aspects of employment protection legislation (covering either 
permanent or temporary contracts) and, as it can be seen from the Table, this 
does not help to further isolate the effects of PMR (as its coefficient remains 
statistically insignificant). 
Table 3 provides an important robustness check on the results above. The 
Global Financial Crisis that started in 2007 and that affected Europe in full in 
2010 (becoming the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis) by its very nature 
generated a similar response across countries. The extent of symmetry 
increased rapidly and broadly so one may be justifiably concerned that this 
would affect our results. Table 3 shows the simplest test for this idea, namely, 
of whether splitting the sample in 2010 (or in 2007) substantially affect our 
baseline results for NORD. As it is clear from the Table, that does not seem to 
be the case. Some coefficients loose statistical significance but our main 
individual results remain intact and the broad pattern of signs does not seem 
to have changed either. Eurozone membership and trade (or reforms) are again 
key factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C 158.885*** 157.706*** 135.533** 147.812*** 166.534*** 73.414*   (51.121) (48.545) (43.761) (45.754) (43.135) (37.856)        Adj-R2 0.658 0.688 0.708 0.702 0.717 0.691 Durbin-Watson 1.462 1.408 1.341 1.369 1.360 1.324 J-Stat (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)        
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Table 3.  How Did the Eurozone Crisis affect NORD Dynamics? (16 countries, 1991-2010)   Fiscal Financial External Trade Labour All Debt/GDP 0.230***     0.017   (0.085)     (0.228) Adj. Budget Balance 0.958**     -0.398   (0.414)     (1.765)         Corporate bond spread  -0.158    0.794    (0.623)    (0.846) Gvt bond spread  2.465    -8.156    (2.683)    (5.929) 3-month interbank spread  -4.955**    2.741    (2.106)    (5.042) Avg on consumer loans spread  -0.026    0.383    (0.506)    (1.194) Return on equity diff.  0.519    -0.805    (0.418)    (0.611) FDI   -0.626***   -0.370     (0.181)   (0.248) Reer (CPI adj.)   -0.308**   -0.820*     (0.129)   (0.462) Trade openness (%GDP)    -0.041  -0.436      (0.096)  (0.385) EPL temporary     6.008*** 2.902       (2.085) (4.346) PMR     8.987** -1.073       (4.246) (12.158)         Eurozone membership dummy -16.89*** -25.437*** -9.655*** -12.62*** -7.104** -14.613** 1999 (2.213) (3.289) (2.187) (2.409) (3.389) (7.170)         C 62.510*** 79.559*** 105.507*** 75.848*** 43.183*** 185.747**   (5.132) (2.004) (13.000) (6.734) (9.280) (79.816)                 Adj-R2 0.729 0.677 0.659 0.693 0.785 0.605 Durbin-Watson 0.643 1.018 0.684 0.535 0.823 1.509 J-Stat (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
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One remaining important concern regards the robustness and magnitude of the 
effect of Euro membership. One way of further investigating this issue is to re-
estimate the specifications in Table 1 using the differences-in-differences 
estimator. This estimator requires that euro membership is modelled as the 
treatment. The introduction of the euro took place between 1999 and 2002 when 
twelve European countries started using the single currency. 8  The main 
coefficient of interest is the interaction between time and the dummy for 
Eurozone membership. As it can be seen, this coefficient is significant 
throughout and carries the expected negative sign. Adoption of the single 
currency, everything else equal, makes the probability of countries being 
classified as core significantly larger. This coefficient can be interpreted as 
showing that the “pure” effect of Eurozone membership is to decrease the 
likelihood that a country is classified as periphery by about 10 (ten) percentage 
points. In light of the role played by the various other factors suggested by OCA 
theory, this is a non-trivial and sensible estimate in our view. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 8 The next country to join was Slovenia in 2017, followed by Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014 and Lithuania in 2015. However, because all of these were communist countries before 1990, data required for our exercise is not available as it does not go back to 1990.   
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Table 4.  Difference in Differences Evidence on the Effects of Euro Membership on the Dynamics of NORD  (16 countries, 1991-2015)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   Fiscal Financial External Trade Labour All Time -0.231 -0.324*** 0.075 0.187 -0.276 -0.041   (0.159) (0.168) (0.127) (0.151) (0.287) (0.371) Time*EZ membership -1.093*** -0.673* -0.744*** -0.744*** -0.585* -0.851**   (0.282) (0.260) (0.245) (0.245) (0.310) (0.364) Debt/GDP 0.260***     0.135**   (0.044)     (0.066) Adj. Budget Balance 0.729***     0.342   (0.260)     (0.315) Corporate bond spread  0.053    0.307    (0.360)    (0.441) Gvt bond spread  0.787*    0.294    (0.435)    (0.566) 3-month interbank spread  -2.758***    -1.496    (0.764)    (1.224) Avg on consumer loans spread  -0.487*    -0.549    (0.271)    (0.461) Return on equity diff.  0.006    -0.034    (0.004)    (0.056) FDI   -0.038   0.041     (0.072)   (0.071) Reer (CPI adj.)   -0.147   -0.255*     (0.091)   (0.151) Trade openness (%GDP)    -0.094  -0.269**      (0.075)  (0.108) EPL temporary     1.800 0.314       (1.641) (1.930) PMR     -3.960 -2.295       (4.590) (4.964) Eurozone membership dummy 4.574 -11.604** -0.973 -0.196 -3.748 -11.643* 1999 (5.116) (4.877) (4.665) (4.518) (5.317) (6.684) C 62.573*** 84.011*** 87.293 78.055*** 81.737*** 122.577***   (3.638) (2.511) (9.355) (4.738) (12.946) (23.234)                Adj-R2 0.758 0.793 0.709 0.709 0.784 0.819 Durbin-Watson 0.564 0.807 0.471 0.459 0.664 0.948 J-Stat (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
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To conclude, this section has shown a sequence of results intended to check 
whether NORD can be said to be satisfactory as a continuous time-variant 
measure of the likelihood of a country being classified in the periphery or in 
the core. The associations we uncover are all intuitive and in extremely few 
cases we encounter results that are not sensible. The role of Eurozone 
membership behaves according to the predictions from endogenous OCA 
theory (Frankel and Rose, 1998). The results for foreign investment inflows and 
trade openness (or otherwise product market regulations) are also very much 
in line with OCA theoretical predictions (De Grauwe 2016). The results for 
fiscal and financial liberalisation variables are equally judicious and accord to 
theoretical priors, despite not being as robust as for other variables. The main 
results we obtain for NORD are also not affected by splitting the sample in 
before and after the Eurozone crisis of 2010, by using different estimators (like 
logit or OLS), variations on the measurement of the key variables (such as using 
2002 for the Eurozone dummy) and the use of standard differences-in-
differences. In sum, these results should give one confidence that NORD is a 
more than adequate continuous time-variant measure of the likelihood of a 
country being classified as periphery and as such should be given the chance 
to be further investigated and developed. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The objective of this paper is to attempt to further our understanding of 
symmetry and its dynamics in currency unions, specifically in the context of 
the European Economic and Monetary Union. One main concern was to try to 
go beyond the mainly static and binary ways of framing this issue. We put 
forward a new simple theory-based measure that we think can successfully 
locate countries in a core-periphery continuum. We construct such measure for 
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a set of 16 European countries yearly from 1987 to 2015 and provided an 
assessment, based on the endogenous OCA theory, of the main potential 
underlying explanatory factors of the dynamics of this measure over time and 
across countries.  
Our main conclusion is that this new theory-based measure allows us to clearly 
identify three clear sets of countries on the basis not only of the level of our new 
measure but also in terms of its dynamic behaviour. Using the Phillips-Sul 
(2007) testing procedure, we show the emergence a newer set of core countries 
(composed by Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and Netherlands), a 
mixed set of countries (namely Denmark, Sweden, Greece, Spain and the UK), 
and a set of deep-rooted periphery countries (Finland, Ireland, Norway, 
Portugal, and Switzerland).  
There are valuable lessons from the dynamics of this measure. Our findings 
suggest that the irreversibility of being in the core should not be taken for 
granted. Our index increases for core countries (which confirms endogenous 
OCA predictions), remains worrisomely constant for a periphery, and varies 
substantially for the intermediate set of countries. Spain (Sweden and Greece) 
becomes consistently more (less) core over time, Denmark’s remains constant 
and the UK moves in and out of core over time. Our panel estimates on a 
specification suggested by endogenous OCA theory imply that euro 
membership and stricter product market regulations (or trade openness) make 
countries more or less likely to be in the core, respectively. The analysis 
presented here documents that the introduction of the single currency 
preceded a substantial increase in symmetry among member states, thus 
improving the stability of the Euro Area.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1.  Data, Sources and definitions 
Annual data spanning the period 1960 - 2015 were collected from the OECD 
Annual National Accounts (unless otherwise specified) through Datastream 
for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Norway, the Netherland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
UK. As in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), Germany is used as a numeraire 
country.  
GDP and its deflator: For each country, growth and inflation were calculated 
as the first difference of the logarithm of real GDP (OECD base year) and the 
implicit GDP deflator. In line with BE the deflator was used to measure prices 
since it reflects the price of output rather than the price of consumption. The 
series used in the VAR were corrected for different regimes in mean, between 
1960-69, for the pre-Bretton Wood, 1984-92 – consistent with the pre-Maastricht 
period, as well as the British sterling and Italian lira EMS dismissal – and after 
2007 (2008-2015).  
Debt / GDP : Gross debt (% of GDP) not seasonally adjusted. 
Adj. Budget balance: Cyclically adjusted balance (% of potential GDP) not 
seasonally adjusted. 
Reer (CPI adj.): Real effective exchange rate based on consumer price index. 
3-month interbank:  Short-term interest rate (3 month, interbank) seasonally 
adjusted. For each country, the spread is obtained as the difference of the yield 
vis à vis Germany. 
Gvt bond: Long-term interest rate on government bonds seasonally adjusted. 
For each country, the spread is obtained as the difference of the yield vis à vis 
Germany. 
Corporate bond: Corporate borrowing rate (avg) not seasonally adjusted. For 
each country, the spread is obtained as the difference of the yield vis à vis 
Germany. 
Avg on consumer loans: Interest rate - average on consumer loans not 
seasonally adjusted. For each country, the spread is obtained as the difference 
of the yield vis à vis Germany. 
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Share: Share price index (%yoy) not seasonally adjusted. For each country, the 
return on equity is obtained as the difference of the price index growth vis à vis 
Germany.  
FDI: (Balance of Payment) FDI - inward, (%GDP) not seasonally adjusted 
EPL permanent: Strictness of employment protection – individual and 
collective dismissals (regular contracts). The OECD indicators of employment 
protection are synthetic indicators of the strictness of regulation on dismissals 
and the use of temporary contracts. For each year, indicators refer to regulation 
in force on the 1st of January. For more information and full methodology, see 
www.oecd.org/employment/protection. 
EPL temporary: Strictness of employment protection – temporary contracts. 
The OECD indicators of employment protection are synthetic indicators of the 
strictness of regulation on dismissals and the use of temporary contracts. For 
each year, indicators refer to regulation in force on the 1st of January. For more 
information and full methodology, see 
www.oecd.org/employment/protection. 
PMR: Product Market Regulation (2013). The indictors measure the economy-
wide regulatory and market environments in (or around) 1998, 2003, 2008 and 
2013. The indicators cover formal regulations in the following areas: state 
control of business enterprises; legal and administrative barriers to 
entrepreneurship; barriers to international trade and investment. A continuous 
series is obtained by interpolating the last available observation. 
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Appendix 2.  Descriptive statistics (common sample) 
 
Adj. 
Budget  
Balance  
Debt / 
GDP 
Corporate 
bond 
interest 
rate 
Gvt bond 
interest 
rate 
3-month 
interbank 
interest 
rate 
Avg on 
consumer 
loans 
interest 
rate 
Share 
prices 
 Mean -2.761 67.641 4.682 4.788 3.173 9.225 6.839  Median -2.444 60.314 4.575 4.328 3.038 8.220 9.520  Maximum 4.354 177.677 13.420 22.498 16.202 45.330 101.320  Minimum -18.609 22.940 0.000 0.647 0.020 2.690 -44.740  Std. Dev. 3.104 29.023 2.463 2.355 2.275 5.205 22.138  Skewness -1.059 0.927 0.616 2.972 1.621 3.418 0.120  Kurtosis 5.753 3.554 4.762 18.224 8.304 20.477 3.238          Jarque-Bera 142.784 44.303 54.693 3160.626 457.303 4167.579 1.357  Probability (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.507)          Observations 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 
 
FDI 
Reer 
(CPI 
adj.) 
Exports / 
GDP 
Imports 
/ GDP 
EPL 
Permanent 
contracts 
EPL 
Temp. 
contracts 
PMR  Mean 6.331 99.670 43.159 40.097 2.324 1.960 1.596  Median 2.800 99.950 39.936 35.806 2.357 1.563 1.517  Maximum 124.400 125.710 106.776 89.624 4.583 4.750 2.751  Minimum -6.750 80.930 14.287 18.640 1.095 0.250 0.915  Std. Dev. 12.255 7.010 19.427 15.840 0.635 1.184 0.377  Skewness 5.349 0.667 1.008 1.145 0.525 0.682 1.037  Kurtosis 41.957 4.672 3.540 3.570 4.841 2.691 4.113          Jarque-Bera 19313.540 54.121 51.583 65.918 53.170 23.143 65.514  Probability (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  Observations 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 
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Appendix 3. Correlation matrix 
Correlation 
NORD Debt/ GDP Adj. Budget  Balance 
Avg on consumer  loans spread 
Gvt bond spread 
Return on equity diff. 
3-month interbank spread 
Exports  (%GDP) Imports  (%GDP) Trade openness (%GDP) 
Reer (CPI adj.) FDI EPL perm. EPL temp. PMR 
SORE 1.000               Debt/GDP -0.236 1.000              Adj. Budget Balance 0.087 -0.332 1.000             Avg on consumer loans spread -0.027 0.286 -0.189 1.000            Gvt bond spread 0.041 0.522 -0.285 0.480 1.000           Return on equity diff. 0.079 -0.169 0.213 0.011 -0.247 1.000          3-month interbank spread 0.000 0.063 -0.180 0.765 0.424 0.050 1.000         Exports (%GDP) 0.052 -0.087 0.219 -0.315 -0.146 -0.009 -0.307 1.000        Imports (%GDP) -0.016 0.036 0.126 -0.211 -0.097 -0.079 -0.299 0.954 1.000       Trade openness (%GDP) 0.022 -0.032 0.179 -0.272 -0.125 -0.041 -0.307 0.991 0.986 1.000      Reer (CPI adj.) -0.189 -0.148 -0.144 -0.197 -0.033 -0.084 -0.015 -0.105 -0.133 -0.119 1.000     FDI -0.084 0.023 0.122 -0.104 -0.062 -0.118 -0.100 0.482 0.502 0.496 -0.060 1.000    EPL all  0.018 0.143 -0.170 0.258 0.120 0.004 0.129 -0.346 -0.249 -0.306 -0.139 -0.110 1.000   EPL temp. 0.055 0.391 -0.248 0.327 0.203 0.018 0.356 -0.443 -0.377 -0.418 -0.304 -0.168 0.383 1.000  PMR  0.278 -0.124 0.054 0.112 -0.101 0.116 0.095 -0.091 -0.131 -0.110 -0.185 -0.048 0.138 0.421 1.000 
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Appendix 4.  Table 1A – Test for over-identifying restrictions’ 
count (% of bootstrap replications) 
 
Since we are mostly interested in evaluating the extent to which the number of 
rejections hold from an OCA point of view and – under the assumption that 
the euro area is closer to an OCA than the EU or whole Europe itself (see also 
De Grauwe 2016) – we select the value of γ which minimizes the number of 
rejections as in Campos and Macchiarelli (2016), as illustrated in the Table 
below.  
 
 
# of 
rejections 
𝜸 = 𝟎. 𝟏 
 
# of 
rejections 
𝜸 = 𝟎. 𝟓 
 
# of 
rejections 
𝜸 = 𝟏 
 
# of 
rejections 
𝜸 = 𝟏. 𝟓 
 
# of 
rejections 
𝜸 = 𝟐 
 BE 100.0 66.2 17.4 53.5 83.9 DE 99.8 94.0 25.1 18.3 47.1 DK 100.0 95.6 35.5 16.2 36.8 ES 99.8 99.0 74.2 35.4 21.8 FR 100.0 77.5 20.3 39.3 68.5 GR 94.6 100.0 92.5 63.5 35.8 IE 100.0 100.0 98.4 86.8 64.9 IT 100.0 69.4 14.6 51.8 84.9 NL 100.0 93.7 20.2 17.3 50.0 PT 100.0 99.9 89.2 53.2 24.8 UK 99.8 94.0 50.2 27.2 33.6       Total largest EZ3 99.9 86.7 30.9 32.4 54.5 Total largest EZ5 99.9 88.4 21.9 25.0 55.2 Total EZ9 99.4 88.9 50.2 46.6 53.5 No of countries > threshold 11 11 4 5 4 Note: We bootstrap the original VAR residuals in a i.i.d. fashion and generate 10.000 data sets. For each of the 10.000 samples we recalculate the VAR parameters. At each replication, we proceed with the SVAR analysis proposed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) and further impose the over-identifying restriction by counting the number of rejections. Cut off value is that of a χ2(1) with probability 0.999 (10.828). The results are robust if this probability is reduced to 0.99 (6.635). The countries for which this restriction is rejected on average more than in 50.5% of cases are the ones for which the over-identifying restriction is relaxed. For consistency of the results, the number of cases the SVAR does not converge is excluded from the count. Source: Campos and Macchiarelli (2016)          
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Appendix 5. Changing the date for EZ membership (2002) 
 
The following results replicate the results proposed in Table 1 by changing the 
date for the euro area dummy from the year of formal introduction (1999 – cf. 
Table 1) to the date of actual adoption (2002). 
   1991-2015   Fiscal Financial External Trade Labour All Debt/GDP 0.139***     0.136   (0.043)     (0.132) Adj. Budget  0.295     1.395  Balance (0.332)     (0.997) Corporate bond   1.174*    0.706  spread  (0.711)    (0.652) Gvt bond spread  1.211    -0.432    (0.934)    (1.582) 3-month interbank   -2.917*    0.877  spread  (1.649)    (2.922) Avg on consumer   -0.527    -0.808  loans spread  (0.587)    (0.988) Return on equity.  0.917*    -0.418  diff  (0.511)    (0.453) FDI   -0.596***   -0.543***     (0.143)   (0.190) Reer (CPI adj.)   -0.143   -0.282     (0.120)   (0.265) Trade openness     -0.165***  -0.491***  (%GDP)    (0.063)  (0.182) EPL temporary     6.153*** 4.809       (1.880) (4.565) PMR     7.568** 1.453       (3.476) (6.781) EZ membership -15.497*** -22.129*** -11.756*** -10.324*** -5.715** -9.541* 2002 (1.896) (3.139) (1.742) (2.018) (2.637) (5.731) C 63.447*** 77.157*** 88.323*** 83.722*** 44.175*** 122.460***   (3.061) (2.258) (12.009) (4.618) (7.248) (40.149)         Effect Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Adj-R2 0.739 0.560 0.669 0.708 0.785 0.727 Durbin-Watson 0.579 1.111 0.584 0.477 0.711 1.194 J-Stat (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)        
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Appendix 6. Results for Employment Protection Legislation: 
Temporary vs Permanent   
 
The results in the Table below compare the results in Table 1 (column (1)) to 
the results when EPL for regular contract is used (column (2)). In column (3) to 
(5) we further explore the possible interactions between EPL and 
imports/exports consistent with the idea that some (non-tradeable) sectors may 
be displaying larger flexibility than others. Our results below do not display 
any significant effects when these interaction terms are used.  
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Debt/GDP 0.090 0.147 0.117 0.128 0.131   (0.141) (0.131) (0.151) (0.130) (0.152) Adj. Budget Balance 1.629* 1.237 1.182 1.487 1.524   (0.965) (1.147) (0.924) (0.928) (0.941) Corporate bond spread 0.701 0.448 1.176 0.221 -0.054   (0.679) (0.708) (0.931) (0.795) (1.018) Gvt bond spread -0.460 -2.182 -1.104 -2.231 -2.400   (1.669) (1.798) (2.136) (2.014) (2.208) 3-month interbank spread -0.760 0.675 -1.613 1.331 1.451   (2.742) (2.337) (2.348) (2.348) (2.565) Avg on consumer loans spread -0.360 -0.371 0.196 -0.709 -0.640   (0.866) (0.803) (0.775) (0.751) (0.794) Return on equity diff. -0.623 -0.593 -0.500 -0.656 -0.634   (0.397) (0.382) (0.396) (0.419) (0.415) FDI -0.419** -0.423** -0.474** -0.402* -0.400*   (0.202) (0.198) (0.218) (0.207) (0.211) Reer (CPI adj.) -0.492* -0.487* -0.278 -0.601** -0.616**   (0.294) (0.289) (0.294) (0.288) (0.291) Trade openness (%GDP) -0.457** -0.477**       (0.191) (0.184)     EPL temporary 4.468        (3.856)      EPL permanent  -19.657        (19.700)     EPL temporary * Exports   -0.189  0.271     (0.446)  (0.605) EPL temporary * Imports   0.143  -0.254     (0.428)  (0.593) EPL permanent * Exports      -0.179 -0.360       (0.377) (0.512) EPL permanent * Imports      -0.498 -0.310       (0.483) (0.582) 
Symmetry and Convergence in Monetary Unions 
 
 47 
PMR 1.906 2.443 14.985*** -1.750 -2.525   (6.872) (6.728) (5.488) (6.545) (6.955) EZ membership -15.363** -17.787*** -19.739*** -15.368*** -14.307** 1999 (6.243) (5.430) (5.928) (5.656) (6.150) C 147.812*** 199.591*** 81.250*** 194.549*** 194.926***   (45.754) (57.976) (36.193) (44.349) (44.027)         Effect Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed       FiAdj-R2 0.748 0.715 0.704 0.713 0.717 Durbin-Watson 0.577 1.325 1.287 1.391 1.380 J-Stat (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
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Appendix 7. Probit results 
 
The results in Table 1 are replicated using a probit model where 
Pr(NORD>50%)=1. The results in this table show that our findings are robust 
to the use of such a model. 
   1991-2015 (Probit)   Fiscal Financial External Trade Labour All Debt/GDP -0.004     -0.022***   (0.002)     (0.005) Adj. Budget Balance 0.037     -0.054*   (0.024)     (0.030) Corporate bond spread  0.000    0.179***    (0.035)    (0.055) Gvt bond spread  0.129**    0.373***    (0.063)    (0.084) 3-month interbank spread  -0.324***    -0.523***    (0.090)    (0.151) Avg on consumer loans   0.033    0.032  spread  (0.024)    (0.037) Return on equity diff.  0.005    0.006    (0.006)    (0.006) FDI   0.002   0.000     (0.006)   (0.008) Reer (CPI adj.)   -0.015**   -0.070***     (0.007)   (0.021) Trade openness (%GDP)    0.003  0.002      (0.002)  (0.003) EPL temporary     -0.018 0.273**       (0.080) (0.124) PMR     0.555** -0.149       (0.258) (0.367) EZ membership -0.887*** -1.401*** -0.905 -0.901*** -0.942*** -1.756*** 1999 (0.148) (0.187) (0.136) (0.131) (0.181) (0.358) C 1.441*** 1.411*** 2.544*** 0.788*** 0.312 9.573***   (0.187) (0.156) (0.732) (0.166) (0.446) (2.700)         Obs with Dep=1 271 255 335 335 233 199 Total obs  381  360  462  462  320  284  McFadden R-squared 0.112 0.159 0.089 0.084 0.133 0.284 LR statistic 51.437 69.183 48.394 45.730 49.770 98.313 Prob (LR statistic) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000 (0.000) (0.000)        
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Appendix 8. Beta convergence estimates   
The results in the Table below regress the change in NORD index on the usual 
sets of control used in Table 1 plus the value of NORD in the first period, i.e. 
NORD(0). The results show that there is no convergence across the panel when 
a test for β-convergence is used.  
   1991-2015   Fiscal Financial External Trade Labour All NORD(0) 0.003534 0.002187 0.010137 0.003679 0.003471 -0.00102   (0.027) (0.032) (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.043) Debt/GDP -0.002      0.035   (0.019)      (0.032) Adj. Budget Balance -0.174      -0.251   (0.166)      (0.250) Corporate bond spread   0.089     0.129     (0.295)     (0.374) Gvt bond spread   0.278     0.370     (0.500)     (0.654) 3-month interbank spread   0.540     1.290     (0.640)     (0.915) Avg on consumer loans    -0.204     -0.660**  spread   (0.148)     (0.276) Return on equity diff.   0.000     0.089     (0.003)     (0.054) FDI    -0.110***    -0.131**      (0.041)    (0.056) Reer (CPI adj.)    0.015    -0.078      (0.052)    (0.102) Trade openness (%GDP)     -0.008   -0.003       (0.013)   (0.024) EPL temporary     0.101 -1.387       (0.547) (0.926) PMR      -0.732 1.298        (1.606) (2.205) EZ membership -1.268 -1.213 -0.951 -1.508 -1.575 0.340 1999 (1.016) (1.139) (0.919) (0.916) (1.174) (1.542) C -0.819 -0.821 -1.859 0.423 0.830 4.663   (2.419) (2.433) (6.171) (1.899) (2.884) (11.897)           Adj-R2 -0.002 -0.006 0.016 0.002 -0.007 0.027 Durbin-Watson 2.249 2.326 2.377 2.343 2.215 2.358 J-Stat (p-value) (0.531) (0.663) (0.030) (0.280) (0.765) (0.103)           
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Appendix 9. Phillips-Sul results 
  Original clubs' log(t) tests  Log(t) test for club merging log(t) Club1 Club2 Club3 Club4 Club5 log(t) Club1+2 Club2+3 Club3+4 Club4+5 Coeff 0.853 -0.585 0.465 1.433 -0.817 Coeff -0.891 -1.3 -0.398 -1.538 T-stat 0.601 -0.83 0.283 0.798 -1.179 T-stat -1.378 -1.478 -0.395 -2.895 
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